The number of votes a candidate must receive in order to be elected under quota-preferential methods, called the quota, depends on the district magnitude. The quota is set to be the smallest number which prevents too many candidates being elected (it is one vote more than the total number of votes divided by one plus the district magnitude). For example, with nine members to be elected, a candidate must obtain slightly more than ten percent of the votes to be elected. Up to one quota of votes can be wasted; this gives a measure of how many voters are not adequately represented and how far the result deviates from ``perfect'' proportionality (which is, of course, impossible to achieve). If the quota is too large (the district magnitude too small) a substantial fraction of the votes can be wasted and the Legislative Council can be unrepresentative, as it often has been until now. We consider that the district magnitude must be at least five (and preferably at least seven) to ensure a reasonably representative Legislative Council. The district magnitude should also be an odd number so that if a party obtains an absolute majority of votes in an electorate it is guaranteed to obtain an absolute majority of seats (with an even number it may only obtain half the seats).
The district magnitude, the size of the Council, the size of the electorates and the number of overlapping terms (if any) are interdependent -- it is not possible to change one without changing another. The district magnitude is proportional to the Council and electorate sizes and inversely proportional to the number of overlapping terms. Doubling the size of the Council or the size of electorates or abolishing two overlapping terms doubles the district magnitude and hence (approximately) halves the quota, other things being equal. To maximise proportionality and minimise vote wastage in theory, we should therefore have the largest possible Council, a single state-wide electorate and no overlapping terms. However, there are several issues that mean this is a poor solution in practice.
First, there is a trend towards smaller parliaments and it is doubtful the voters of Victoria would like to see a large increase in the size of the Legislative Council; the status quo or a slight decrease seem to be more widely supported. Second, there are advantages in electorates having some local or regional association, so elected members represent voters in a smaller area rather than the whole state and particularly voters outside Melbourne feel better represented. Candidates and members can also maximise their contact with voters if the electorates are smaller than the whole state. Third, the number of candidates standing and the resulting size of the ballot papers would make voting an arduous task. Every candidate in the whole state appears on the ballot paper and the particularly small quota can encourage many small parties or individuals to stand. It would be just too difficult for most voters to make an informed decision about their preferences. It is likely that mechanisms such as group voting tickets would be introduced which make it easier to vote but actually take power away from the voters (see Section 3.5). We recommend that no more than eleven candidates be elected per electorate. Seven and nine member electorates (our preferred sizes) still give good proportionality while retaining regional electorates and manageable ballot papers and is compatible with a single term or two overlapping terms with a Council size similar to now.