It is claimed that intra-party competition - "political cannibalism" among candidates of the same party - is destructive of party unity: "Candidates are faced with much of the old necessity of fighting and scheming for personal support, under conditions which are much worse than the old ones; for they must do so against their friends, and in constituencies six times larger..." [186]
However, the major parties are already themselves "coalitions of a range of diverse views in the community... big unhappy families." [187] It is wrong to assume that "there are only two main views on any issue, when there are, if not 16 million, at least a wide variety." [188] As Edmund Burke stated; "Men thinking freely will, in particular instances, think differently."
Within each party, there are different shades of opinion, and strong debate over policies and principles: "... the party rooms... have in a sense become mini-parliaments themselves, with their own 'governments' (in Labor's case, the Right; in the Liberals', the Dries) and 'oppositions' (the left and the wets, respectively)." [189]
As ALP National. Secretary Bob Hogg told the National Press Club; "We would be better served in the long run if open dialogue within the parties was encouraged." [190]
Yet without intra-party choice (such as Hare-Clark would provide), voters have no influence over the balance of power within this single-party coalition: "When the parties are deeply divided, the policies emerging from an "intra-party" coalition may be less representative, and reached less publicly than policies thrashed out in bargaining between separate parties." [191]
Nor is there any way for parties to know the true level of public support for each faction. In 1987 and 1989, ordinary National Party supporters in the electorate had no say whatsoever in the leadership struggles between Joh Bjelke-Petersen, Mike Ahern, and Russell Cooper. Likewise, struggles between "wets" and "dries" in the Liberal Party, between left and right in the ALP, all take place behind closed doors. By contrast, Fianna Fáil voters in Éire can - and do - choose among candidates known to be supporters or opponents of the party's controversial leader, Charles Haughey.
Some accept that disunity exists, but claim that it should be resolved behind closed doors:
"We do not suggest that competition and debate between members of the same party is, in itself, bad. Rather, we consider that it is preferable if most of that competition takes place inside party forums rather than before the wider electorate." [192]
This is a noble ideal, but unfortunately does not work that way in real life. The unedifying reality is that "... if the true facts of internal party manoeuvring and faction-fighting were published, they would reflect no credit on anyone and would be quite likely to produce a thoroughly justified adverse reaction in the public at large." [193]
Yet under the single-member system,
"Behind-the-scenes manipulation of a party's machinery may be far more effective than open advocacy of a cause... a minority... may be inhibited from putting its case honestly to the electors... a person on the left of the Labour party, who is convinced that the party is betraying its socialist ideals... has a right, indeed a duty, to say so ... [but such] people of "extreme" opinions likely to frighten off voters must be persuaded to play them down. Until the election is safely won."It does not then follow that the "extreme" policies will not be put into effect, for it may well happen that their advocates will have managed to get themselves selected as candidates for most of the winnable seats and so to dominate the Parliamentary party." [194]
Nor should it be thought that denying the voters any choice of candidates contributes to party unity. With the stage-managed order of election for the Senate, each safe seat is "a major prize for which competition in the party hierarchy will be fierce." [195]
The Labo[u]r parties of Australia, Britain, and New Zealand are highly factionalised and divided, even without intra-party choice. In fact, it is feasible to suggest that breakaway groups - the Social Democrats in Britain, the DLP in Australia, and more recently the New Labour Party in New Zealand - split from the party because the electoral system offered them no way to remain within the party and invite the voters to choose between them and their factional opponents.
Intra-party competition may well, in fact, be more divisive when the electorate is not called in to resolve disputes between warring factions: "... under the PR-STV system, where battles are fought in the open, a candidate was restrained by the risk of losing public support if he attacked a party colleague intemperately." [196]
A decision by the voters is more likely to be accepted as legitimate than decisions reached by a small group of party activists. A system of intra-party choice would mean that:
"... candidates are more closely attuned to electoral aspirations and more reflective of electoral views and values... candidates' overriding responsibilities are to the people who... elect them to the legislatures, rather than to the much narrower groups which hold power over political endorsements." [197]
The DLP's resentment that its members' expulsion from the ALP had been carried out "behind closed doors" embittered its relations with the ALP for twenty years.
We are living in an era when the participatory ethic is becoming widespread, and when all of us want more control over matters affecting our own lives:
"Experience has shown that ordinary people, though not infallible... on the whole make fewer mistakes than governing elites, even elected ones... The way to make people more responsible is to give them some responsibility." [198]
Even if more or less the same candidates were elected under Hare-Clark as under the stage-managed system, they would be publicly recognised as having the confidence of the voters, not just the parties. Justice would not only be done, but also seen to have been done.
Whatever ill-will intra-party competition may allegedly generate on the campaign trail does not seem to have carried over into Parliament after the election. Parties under Hare-Clark have governed effectively and unitedly, [199] and party discipline has remained solid. [200]
Former Tasmanian Premier Sir Robert Cosgrove thought competition among MPs was a good thing; "It keeps members on their toes." [201] And others have questioned whether such competition is undesirable:
"If the candidates of a party are so much concerned with their own personal fortunes that they are willing under provocation to campaign against the party's other candidates, it is just as well that the voters in general should know about it... But if a party is really united, there is no need under proportional representation for a contest to develop among its candidates, even though it is evident they cannot all be elected. The reasonable course in such a case is to leave each candidate to speak for the party, leaving it up to the individual voter to determine his own order of preference among the party's candidates... Under proportional representation, there is no useful purpose served by limiting the number of a party's candidates." [202]
In any event, the grounds on which candidates of the same party can compete against each other will be limited by their need to support a common party policy. [203]
By encouraging a choice of candidates, then, Hare-Clark would not abolish parties, but make them "less rigid, more elastic, and more responsive to the opinions of the electorate." [204] It would "deprive the "machine" of the control of politics through the mere control of nominations and leave it only with the legitimate power that comes from leadership and organisation." [205]
Hare-Clark allows a role for parties in the selection process, and thus balances individual choice with collective cohesion; it produces a situation where: "The activists make the first cut... and the broader party electorate makes the final decision." [206]
But why should they have to join? Why should their freedom of association be compromised merely because they want a say in which individuals, as well as which parties, go into Parliament to represent them?
Ministers do not drive their own government cars, nor do MPs type their own official correspondence; instead they hire others to specialise in carrying out these tasks for them. For the same reason voters may not wish to become directly involved in public affairs, but instead prefer to participate simply by choosing representatives.
Not everyone has the time needed to be a party activist "... the level of activity required... effectively excludes from power all but the most intensely committed..." [211]
Nor the inclination: "... steps to the acquisition of high office in a political party usually do not have much quality of democracy about them. Apart from faithful party service, however mindless in content, the main talent required is one for intrigue and ruthless self-interest." [212]
This means that active party members are a special class: "Party membership never accounts for more than a tiny majority of voters, probably less than 1% in Australia ... joiners of voluntary associations, particularly the much smaller group of active members, tend to be unrepresentative, socially and ideologically, of the general population..." [213]
In fact, it is possible that, if we put aside the "ridiculous pretence - that a political party is a monolith which must be supported or opposed in its entirety" [214] and encourage a free choice among candidates of each party, ordinary voters would take more interest in the different factions and shades of opinion within the parties; this could well mean an increased level of party membership. [215]
However, we might argue in reply that "Nowhere in democratic theory is there anything to suggest that it is a good thing for representatives to have job security." On the contrary, "the constant possibility of defeat is necessary to keep them responsive." [217]
In our executive-dominated Westminster system Ministers enjoy vastly more power and privilege than do ordinary backbenchers. It would balance this (particularly after the recent accounts of Ministerial rorts in Queensland) if they had to work harder to get re-elected. It would also make them more sensitive to the opinions of voters at the grass roots, which may be too easily ignored by a Minister with a safe seat. As Barry Cohen (himself a former Minister) comments:
"One of the main problems all political parties have is that those who tend to finish up as the leaders are the ones who survive the regular large swings which seem to come around every seven or eight years, or those who hold one of the first two positions on the Senate ticket. Because of their minimal contact with the rank and file, they lack the political antennae of those in the marginals. Nothing concentrates the mind more wonderfully than a margin of 2 or 3%." [218]
This inhibits the recruitment of talented newcomers into the parties:
"If a party member... shows a certain talent for getting across to the public and attracting votes, he is likely to be put in marginal seat in the hope that he can sway the small number of votes necessary to retain it or else get it back for the party. If he succeeds... he is likely to be left where he is so that he can repeat the trick... when there is a significant swing against one party or another, a high proportion of the victims are the relatively talented younger people with whom the future of that party ought to lie. The safe seats are reserved... for those who, by virtue of long service to the party machine, are considered to have earned some sort of reward at the public expense..." [219]
Further, the complacency engendered by having a safe seat can be very politically dangerous. For example, after the huge swings against Labor in its safe seats in the 1988 New South Wales election, it was commented that the members for those seats "should have detected such large-scale disillusionment and reported it to party headquarters, but they did not." [220]
It is doubtful whether many Ministers would be at risk under a Hare-Clark system. Certainly there are many senior party figures whose personal support among the voters is derisorily low. [221] But usually Ministers have a much higher profile (and greater opportunity for patronage) than do ordinary backbenchers. Thus they are more likely to be re-elected under Hare-Clark, even though they may be more often absent from their electorates. Experience from Tasmania and elsewhere [222] shows that Ministers, party leaders, and other sitting members do indeed receive the most personal votes, but only as long as they perform satisfactorily in the voters' eyes. [223]
This greater chance of re-election can be useful for "freeing Ministers and leaders from some constituency work, particularly in times of great pressure. Such work can be handled by backbenchers from their party in the region." [224]
Moreover, under any electoral system, some - perhaps many - voters will choose candidates solely or mainly on a personal basis. Whether this is good or bad is a matter of political judgement. But in a single-member electorate such personal votes could well take the seat away from one party and give it to another. By voting against an unsatisfactory local member, voters could end up turning out a government they may still support. Under Hare-Clark, such personal votes are likely only to switch seats within the parties. (However, if all of the party's candidates are bad, then the party as a whole will lose votes).
For example, senior Tasmanian Liberal Minister Peter Rae was unseated at the 1989 election, largely due to campaigning by the Tasmanian Teachers' Association. Had the choice in that electorate been restricted to only one candidate (or one ordered ticket) from each party, the votes against Rae could have cost the Liberal Party a seat and changed the balance of the whole Parliament. [225] But under Hare-Clark, Liberal voters could reject Rae without threatening their party's chances of winning.
This logic is questionable. Has a Labor voter helped in any way to elect a Labor government if his/her only representative in Parliament is a Liberal? Or vice versa? Furthermore, the chance to pick and choose among candidates is "an opportunity which it is very clear that Tasmanian voters seize with gusto." [227] If the voters are distracted from their "basic task", they certainly do not seem to resent it.
There is no reason why intra-party choice should make it any harder to vote for a favoured party. [228] The voter simply numbers all the candidates of that party first in his/her own order of preference. (If s/he has none, s/he simply follows the order on the ballot-paper or the order, if any, on the party's how-to-vote card). Even Ray admits that; "While it may not always be easy to predict exactly who will be elected, the struggle for government in Tasmania is fairly straightforward." [229]
The primary purpose of an election is not just "to produce a government" (hereditary or random succession would serve the same function, at less expense), but to produce a government that the voters want. Voters have more control over the government, and more opportunity to ensure that it "reflects their views", if they have direct control over which candidates get elected to the governing party's caucus.
"... individual Tasmanian candidates have their own private armies of doorknockers, some of whom may not be party members. ALP candidates campaign almost exclusively against each other in working-class areas, leaving affluent districts to the Liberals. There are stories of agreements between candidates of rival parties to recommend each other if they meet someone who intends voting for the other party." [230]
Even if these practices are considered undesirable (under the single-member system, no one at all may campaign in working-class areas located in safe Labor electorates) they are no worse than some of the abuses alleged in single-member systems. Against them must be balanced the fact that Hare-Clark would discourage the equally undesirable practices of gerrymandering and of pork-barrelling marginal electorates. Further, these abuses are only "alleged", "mentioned", "hinted" [231] - and what defeated candidate (a recent [1990] example is Janine Haines in Kingston) does not allege dirty tricks by his/her opponents?
But actual experience shows that this fear is unfounded. Despite a few prominent examples (Senator Aulich speaks critically of Norm Sanders turning up at the Tasmanian Parliament in his leather jacket), the proportion of "gimmick" candidates elected in Tasmania is no higher than elsewhere. A leather-jacketed Norm Sanders may be elected in Tasmania, but by the same token a leather-jacketed Pete Steedman has been elected in Melbourne, and a flamboyant Frank "Bombshell" Barnes has been elected in Bundaberg. The experience of countries with open list systems shows that "Switzerland, Luxembourg, Finland, and Italy do not appear to have particularly defective Parliaments compared to the rest of Western Europe, nor do they lack expertise - perhaps measured by the proportion of deputies with third-level education." [235]
It is hard to argue that the quality of Tasmanian State members is noticeably lower than in other Australian legislatures, where many uninspiring personalities (do any names spring to mind?) have safe electorates or safe places on their party's ticket. Some opponents of proportional representation, such as Senator Peter Walsh, [236] have described Senators, whose election is stage-managed by their parties, as "time-serving mediocrities."
The fact that Peter Rae, who topped his electorate's poll in 1986, was ousted by his voters at the next election strongly suggests that the voters must have been aware of his performance and, for reasons they saw fit, found him wanting. [237]
If Rae had been elected in 1986 through a well-financed or "gimmick" campaign, then he should have been re-elected three years later using the same strategy. The fact that he was not suggests that the voters' reasons in rejecting him were more rational than that - at least, no less rational than the choice they make between parties.
In fact, the mainland and Tasmanian media have often praised the "superior sense of judgement" and the "political awareness" of Tasmanian voters. [238] This is due directly to the electoral system: "Of course, no electoral system can guarantee good government; it cannot ensure that the voters choose wisely. But PR-STV does encourage electors to think for themselves, and does give them the consequences of that thought." [239]
However, the problem of campaign financing is thorny issue in any democracy. As Senator David Vigor pointed out; "single-member electorates can be bought too; it just takes a little more money." [242] It is up to the parties to ensure that their candidates have equal access to campaigning resources. [243]
It should be noted that Senator Harradine, without any great personal wealth, has polled over 10% of the Tasmanian state-wide vote in successive Senate elections. In the New South Wales state electorate of Balmain, Dawn Fraser won with an 18% swing in her favour, though spending less than $1400. [244]
This, however, is more a reflection of the conservative nature of Tasmania. Voters elsewhere among candidates do not always discriminate against the more strongly ideological of a party's candidates. The highest number of primary votes polled by a Victorian ALP Senate candidate in 1987 (other than John Button, who polled 740,000 votes, but of course was first on the ticket) was 2,692 for John Halfpenny, well-known as a prominent figure on the Socialist Left of the ALP, as against 1,174 for the next highest, Gareth Evans of the Right.
Moreover, there is nothing inevitable in the nature of multi-member electorates that requires centralised preselection. It is up to local activists in each party to press for a decentralised system. [249]
Under the single-member system, even if an MP is widely known or suspected to be corrupt, his/her party will still hesitate to repudiate him/her as that would reflect badly on them for endorsing him/her in the first place.
But, as pointed out by Sir Robert Cosgrove, former Premier of Tasmania:
"The Hare-Clark system saves us from our mistakes. Some aspiring candidates might not be a credit to their party or the State, but might be able to obtain party endorsement through having friends on the endorsing bodies... On the mainland, if such candidates gain endorsement for a safe seat, they necessarily win a place in Parliament. Here, in Tasmania, the voters can retire them on polling day." [250]
Experience with US primaries, where the voters can choose from a field of candidates from the same party, has shown that (particularly in the post-Watergate era) candidates tainted with corruption are greatly disadvantaged. [251]
In relation to counting of votes, Hare-Clark is "pure and logical... a mathematician's delight." [253] Its general principles are not difficult to grasp, and its results are clearly proportional. (On the other hand, one may need sophisticated computer simulations to account for the distorted results of single-member elections). The process of counting may be complex, but only the trained electoral staff need worry about the details. [254] Most adults are capable of filling out lottery and Medicare forms without knowing the precise details of how the system operates; it is enough that "... voters can be confident that the system is fair, [and] that counting is carried out by impartial officials under the scrutiny of parties and candidates..." [255]
184. Ray, pp 133-134. [Back to text]
185. New Zealand Royal Commission, p 34, para. 2.89; c/f Dale Campbell-Savours, "PR or bust" (New Statesman and Society, 4 September 1989), p 9; Ihlein, pp 21-22; Irvine, p 77. [Back to text]
186. The London Times, 19 March 1913, quoted in Townsley, p 67. [Back to text]
187. Barry Cohen, "A hated one states his case" (The Bulletin, 10 January 1990, p 33). [Back to text]
188. Barry Cohen, "A hated one states his case" (The Bulletin, 10 January 1990, p 33). [Back to text]
189. Mungo MacCallum, "Parliament's Political Safety Valve" (Australian Society, October 1986), p 28. [Back to text]
190. Laurie Oakes, "democracy must be compulsory" (The Bulletin, 24 April 1990), p. 27. [Back to text]
191. Bogdanor, p 253. [Back to text]
192. New Zealand Royal Commission, p 68, paragraphs 2.199-2.200. [Back to text]
193. Colin Howard, The Constitution, Power, and Politics (1980), p 36. [Back to text]
194. Lakeman, p 168. [Back to text]
195. Sharman, p 105. [Back to text]
196. Proctor, p 318. [Back to text]
197. Loosley. [Back to text]
198. Walker, pp 195, 189. [Back to text]
199. Harrop and Miller, p 60. [Back to text]
200. Butler, p 20; Wilson, p 7. [Back to text]
201. Quoted in Good Government (April 1979, p 5). [Back to text]
202. Hoag and Hallett, pp 263-264. [Back to text]
203. New Zealand Royal Commission, p 54, para. 2.143. [Back to text]
204. Bogdanor, p 258. [Back to text]
205. Hoag and Hallett, p 308. [Back to text]
206. Terry Sanford, A Danger of Democracy: The Presidential Nominating Process (Colorado, Westview Press, 1981), p 130. [Back to text]
207. Hain and Hodgson, p 10. [Back to text]
208. Godfrey Hodgson, All Things to All Men: The False Promise of the Modern American Presidency (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984), p 250. [Back to text]
209. Irvine, p 75. [Back to text]
210. Barry Cohen, "A hated one states his case" (The Bulletin, 10 January 1990), p 33; Ian Macphee, "The dangers of political apathy" (The Bulletin, 18 July 1989), p 34. [Back to text]
211. John Dearlove and Peter Saunders, Introduction to British Politics (1984), p 110. [Back to text]
212. Colin Howard, The Constitution, Power, and Politics (1980), p 36. [Back to text]
213. Parkin and Warhurst, Machine Politics in the Australian Labor Party (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p 20; c/f Ian Macphee, "The dangers of political apathy" (The Bulletin, 18 July 1989, p 34). [Back to text]
214. Lakeman, p 3. [Back to text]
215. Further, the abolition of safe seats would be likely to stimulate activity among previously-moribund branches in areas where the opposing party is dominant. [Back to text]
216. Senator Terry Aulich (ALP, Tas), Hansard, Senate, 7 May 1987. [Back to text]
217. Wilson, p 21. [Back to text]
218. Barry Cohen, "Who's got the political ticker?" (The Bulletin, 18 October 1988), p 42. [Back to text]
219. Colin Howard, The Constitution, Power, and Politics (1980), p 35. [Back to text]
220. Laurie Oakes, "The workers revolt" (The Bulletin, 29 March 1988). [Back to text]
221. For example, Senator Robert Ray was elected to the Senate from Victoria in 1987 because of his high position on the ALP ticket, even though he received only 71 primary votes out of 2 million cast in the State - fewer than any other ALP candidate in that election. [Back to text]
222. Proctor, p 318; Marsh, pp 371, 374. [Back to text]
223. Davis, p 197; Bruce Montgomery, "Tasmania and the green House effect" (The Australian, 4 May 1989); Townsley, p 67; Joan Rydon, "Electoral Reform and Parliament" (Legislative Studies Quarterly, Autumn 1988), p 35. [Back to text]
224. Ihlein, p 20. [Back to text]
225. "Shake-up from final cut-up" (The Advocate, 29 May 1989). [Back to text]
226. Ray, pp 123-124. [Back to text]
227. Sharman, pp 106-107. [Back to text]
228. Donald Horne, Elaine Thompson, Dean Jaensch, Ken Turner, Changing the System; Political and Constitutional Reform - Some Options and Difficulties (APSA Monograph #25, 1981), p 31. [Back to text]
229. Ray, p 130. [Back to text]
230. Davis, p 187. [Back to text]
231. Townsley, pp 66-67. [Back to text]
232. Ihlein, p 22. Not only Hare-Clark; the election of "Cicciolina" as an MP under Italy's open-list system shows that other methods can encourage such campaigning as well. [Back to text]
233. Ihlein, p 21. [Back to text]
234. Marsh, p 375. [Back to text]
235. Marsh, p 375. [Back to text]
236. "Minister lashes at "zealots" in Senate" (Courier-Mail, 5 December 1987); Paul Kelly, "The Rising Tide of Senate Review." [Back to text]
237. "Shake-up from formal cut-up" (The Advocate, 29 May 1989). [Back to text]
238. Editorial, The Canberra Times, 19 February 1980. [Back to text]
239. Enid Lakeman, letter to New Statesman and Society, 2 December 1988. [Back to text]
240. Senate, 7 May 1987. [Back to text]
241. Irvine, p 77. [Back to text]
242. Senate, 7 May 1987. [Back to text]
243. Irvine, p 75. [Back to text]
244. Dorothy Carter, "New Dawn for Politics", Sunday-Mail, 31 July 1988, p 25. [Back to text]
245. Davis, p 187. [Back to text]
246. Hain and Hodgson, pp 15-17; Ray, p 134. [Back to text]
247. Whitlam, p 87. [Back to text]
248. Harrop and Miller, pp 59-60. [Back to text]
249. Of course, preselection arrangements are an internal matter for each party to decide, but it is possible to imagine, for example, a model on the following lines:
The electorate is divided into a number of local branches, as many as the total number of seats in the electorate (or the number winnable by the party). The party's paid-up, rank-and-file members in each local branch have power to choose one candidate on the party's team for the electorate. The party's central council, executive, or electoral college cannot veto any candidate so chosen; but it can add extra candidates to the team, to ensure a balanced ticket.
The central party could even be required to add additional candidates to bring the number of women and (in areas where their numbers warrant) ethnic candidates on the team up to a required quota.
Thus the party machine cannot overturn the choice of a local branch, but it can "dilute" that choice by offering the voters a wider range of alternative candidates to vote for. The autonomy of local parties is preserved; each branch could then devote its resources primarily to campaigning for its locally-chosen candidate, thus increasing the representation of its local area and minimising intra-party conflict throughout the electorate. [Back to text]
250. Quoted in Good Government, April 1979, p 5. [Back to text]
251. Terry Sanford, A Danger of Democracy: The Presidential Nominating Process (Colorado, Westview Press, 1981), p 63. [Back to text]
252. As a rule, Australian elections (whether in single- or in multi-member electorates) attract four candidates per seat (Hughes, p 233). Thus we can expect the number of candidates to be about twenty in a five-member electorate and no more than about thirty-six even in a nine-member electorate. [Back to text]
253. Bruce Montgomery, "Winning by a Hare's breadth" (Weekend Australian, 22-23 April 1989). [Back to text]
254. Also, the electoral office would need to keep separate electoral rolls for only 20 or so districts, instead of 89. [Back to text]
255. New Zealand Royal Commission, p 56, para 2.150. [Back to text]