In fact, using these criteria the New Zealand Royal Commission concluded in favour of a system of proportional representation. [257]
For this reason, list systems usually ensure more women candidates and MPs; but this is as a result of the diktat of the party hierarchy. It would be better in the long-term if women candidates were recognised as having won their votes and seats in their own right, not seen as "token" representatives promoted by their party machines.
The Hare-Clark system allows them to do this. In Éire it seems that, despite the traditionally male-dominated culture, Irish women are beginning to mobilise their voting power specifically to elect women candidates. [261]
When preselection is rigidly controlled by parties, as is the case with the single-member system, Aborigines and migrants are disadvantaged by the need to pull strings in the party machine to win preselection; "Penetrating the "selectorate" is a problem. Members of the ethnic minorities are still much less likely to participate actively in politics than the White population. Thus, even when they form a considerable proportion of the population in a constituency, their voice may not be strongly heard among party activists." [263]
Under Hare-Clark, ethnic groups could run and elect their own candidates; the major parties would be encouraged to include ethnic candidates on their own tickets, to attract votes that might otherwise be lost.
It would not be too difficult for ethnic groups to elect their own candidates under our proposed system of five-, seven- and nine-member electorates. The New Zealand Royal Commission thought that Hare-Clark would not allow minority groups to win seats unless they actually amounted to a quota in an electorate:
"The major weakness of STV in respect of Maori representation is that in many constituencies, the number of Maori voters would be relatively small and thus not electorally significant... We consider that MMP [mixed-member proportional - ie, the West German system] provides better prospects for Maori representation than STV..." [264]
But this argument forgets that the racial group does not need to amount to a quota in its own right. An Aborigine, Neville Bonner, was elected as one of ten Senators for Queensland even though fewer than one in ten of Queensland's voters is Aboriginal.
Of course, Bonner's election was due to his high place on the ticket; yet it should not be assumed that a system of free intra-party choice would deny candidates like him the chance of election by exposing them directly to the votes of a prejudiced electorate.
The Aboriginal candidates who ran in the 1974 Senate election - Bruce McGuinness and Elizabeth Hoffman (Aboriginal Independent Party, Victoria) and Neville Bonner (Liberal Party, Queensland) - received far more votes than the number of enrolled Aboriginal voters in those states. [265]
"What this objection boils down to is this; the voters do not know what is good for them; they must be given local representation whether they want it or not. For proportional representation... ensures local representation just to the extent that the voters themselves want it; if a quota of a man's neighbours want to elect him, all the other voters together cannot prevent it." [266]It is likely that Hare-Clark would produce a relatively even distribution of representatives throughout each electorate. In Tasmania, parties are careful to endorse candidates likely to win votes in particular areas, particularly those that complain of belong "under-represented"; [267] and with intra-party choice, voters tend to support candidates who live near them and are known to them. [268]
If each party branch in the electorate devotes its resources primarily to campaigning for its local candidate, then direct intra-party conflict is minimised while still maintaining for voters a choice among candidates.
Yet if different [separatist] groups do emerge, Hare-Clark deprives them of a ground of resentment. AJ Milnor (not generally a supporter of proportional representation) has commented that proportional systems - rather than "helping extremist minor parties" as is often alleged
"... allow the ideological parties the right representation, and deny them the chance to claim they have been left out in the electoral cold despite accumulating a substantial electoral vote. The ease by which representation is attained under proportional representation systems may contribute to stability and integration in the sense of being a safety valve..." [270]
Although many Government Ministers have complained about this, it is clear that such complaints are "melodramatic nonsense, an example of the executive's inability to accept the Senate." [276] For the Senate's assertive role cannot be said to have paralysed or deadlocked the work of government; [277]
"Since 1975, there has been very little important legislation blocked by the Upper House, despite what frustrated Prime Ministers might have to say on the subject. Some tax bills have been modified, and some bills... delayed to the extent that the government has ultimately been forced to abandon them, but governments have been allowed to govern..." [278]
Hare-Clark, by encouraging groups to consolidate into two main parties, usually produces a majority for the governing party - but not a large one. Tasmanian experience shows that this is no disadvantage: "A party with a large majority usually finds it cannot satisfy all its clients, whereupon it is threatened by lack of discipline and disintegration. The Labor Party, in its long period in office, was spared this. With a majority of one, or depending on the good will of an Independent member, it exercised moderation and showed friendliness to all in a spirit of inclusiveness." [279]
On the negative side, it has been claimed that Hare-Clark, by promoting intra-party competition, could induce MPs to neglect their legislative role. [280] In Tasmania, "Members have been accused, perhaps a little unfairly, of concentrating too much on their electorates to the detriment of their Parliamentary duties." [281]
However, this is a reflection of the localist, personalised political culture of Tasmania. It does not follow that "... the system must necessarily work in the same way in countries with very different political cultures, based less on face-to-face relationships and particularistic attitudes, and with greater interest in political programs and issues." [282]
If Hare-Clark were used in Queensland, candidates with a reputation for thinking and voting for themselves in Parliament may well gain an electoral advantage from public recognition; "Merely responding to the party whip is an inadequate strategy for a politician desiring a lengthy career under STV." [283]
With multi-member electorates, each party has the benefit of cooperation among its MPs; "A coordinated team effort in a region can do wonders for the overall image of the political party." [286]
Also, by abandoning the pretence that each election is a disparate collection of purely localised contests in single-member districts, Hare-Clark does justice to each political party at the regional, state, and national level. The system allows like-minded voters, even when geographically dispersed, to group themselves together to elect representatives; and in a modern democracy this grouping will usually be on the basis of party.
Without proportional representation, an opposition party can be badly damaged by an adverse swing (as the Labor Party was in Queensland in 1974 and Federally in 1975);
"A losing party... can face huge long-term problems in terms of lost representation and talent, minuscule resources, and gutted party machinery. In large areas, the party can lose all its presence and have to start again." [287]
By contrast, Hare-Clark would ensure that the party continues to survive and provide a vigorous opposition. In Tasmania, "... the Liberals - condemned for thirty-five years to opposition - always appeared in sufficient strength in Parliament to foster hope and preclude demoralisation." [288]
Parties could expect to see an increase in local branch activity in areas formerly ignored as unwinnable.
So is Hare-Clark, then an "anti-party" system, because it gives more power to ordinary voters? We believe that, on balance, it is not:
"It is true that this is achieved at the expense of a diminution of political party control and in that sense the parties are 'losers.' However, if democracy is to be what it is meant to be - government by the people - it follows that the manner in which an electoral system accommodates the individual voter should be more important than the comfort it offers political parties. Political parties are, by definition, adaptable entities; in any situation they will seek to maximise their advantages. Because Hare-Clark would benefit people in society, ... political parties being associations of persons living in society, in the long term it would benefit the parties as well." [289]
Even when the government has to be formed by coalition negotiations among two or more parties, "... it is clear that the resulting government will have been supported by more than half the electorate, and the coalition will be subject to ratification at future elections." [292]
Recent Queensland history has shown (and it may yet occur at the federal level) that minority governments cannot claim the legitimacy needed to govern effectively. As Winston Churchill said; "No government which is in a large minority in the country, even though it possesses a working majority in the House of Commons, can have the necessary power to cope with real problems." [293]
Because the allocation of seats under Hare-Clark is closely proportional to first-preference votes, and relatively unaffected by the vagaries of electoral boundaries, the outcome can be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy as soon as the first preferences are counted.
With optional preferences, counting of votes can begin immediately; there need be no weeks of delay spent in checking votes for formality before counting starts.
The results of Tasmania's 1989 election were finalised in just two weeks and two days. In Queensland's 1989 election, the result in the seat of Tablelands was not finally declared until 9 January 1990 (one month and seven days after election day); Landsborough was not declared until 4 January 1990; Barron River not until 28 December 1989, and Nicklin (where the result was extremely close) not until 27 December 1989.
And in any case, it could "well be asked; "When weeks have been spent on an election campaign [and the election is for a term of three or four years], does it really matter if it takes a few extra hours to get the result right?" [294]
By requiring that a party without positive majority support cannot win a majority of seats in its own right, Hare-Clark leaves open the possibility that a government may be dependent on minor party support. This, too, would enhance the responsiveness of the system; if the government goes so far wrong that it loses the support of the community, the minor party will withdraw its support and the government will fall. The voters need not wait until the end of a three- or four-year term to remove a government seen as incompetent. Even opponents of proportional representation concede that an electoral system should ensure that "a government which had lost support can be quickly removed and replaced with another." [296]
This is what happened in Australia in 1942, when two Independents withdrew their support from Menzies and put Curtin in power. Few Australians, even conservatives, would claim now that these two Independents exercised their balance of power irresponsibly in doing so.
This is also what happened in West Germany in 1982, when the Free Democratic Party (FDP) changed sides to ally with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and put the Social Democratic (SPD) government out of office.
If West Germany had a single-member system, and the Free Democrats not held the balance of power in the Bundestag, then its centrist supporters would still have the right to vote and thus the power to swing the electoral balance. But they could not have exercised this power until the next elections, due at the end of 1984. The government's accountability would have been "an all-or-nothing event every four or five years, rather than a continual process of interaction." [297]
As it was, elections were held in early 1983 and these endorsed the FDP's decision; the new coalition won over 52% of the votes. (Contrast the Queensland Liberals, whose vote collapsed in 1983 after they left the coalition).
Without proportional representation, West Germany would have continued for another two years under a government which no longer represented the opinion of the country. Even the Social Democrats accepted this as legitimate: "... the breakdown of the coalition in September 1982 (which brought the cry of "betrayal" from the SDP) did not lead to the SDP threatening to change the electoral system." [298]
Some might criticise this as bad for responsible government; governments, they argue, will be discouraged from making courageous long-term decisions if they face the continuous prospect of minor parties withdrawing their support.
Certainly a government with the general confidence of the electorate may need to make specific decisions which are unpopular in the short-term. [299] But when the government as a whole is so unpopular that its former coalition partners feel the voters will not thank them for keeping it in office, then it is better that it be removed to face the voters as soon as possible.
The ideal of the Westminster system is to provide responsiveness - to ensure that a government can be removed from office promptly if its loses the confidence of the people's elected representatives.
Proportional representation would make this ideal a reality, because - unless one party was popular enough to win a clear-cut majority in its own right - the government would always face the possibility of losing minor-party support.
Certainly, in deciding whether to withdraw their support, minor parties will have an eye to their own self-interest; that is what all politicians do, not just those in minor parties. But the possibility of facing the voters, if the defeated government responds by calling an election, would be a sufficient check on "revolving-door government." The loss of a few percentage points in the polls may spell defeat for a major party, but would condemn a minor party to extinction.
257. However, the specific form it favoured was the West German additional-member system {though it gave STV a high rating). Its reasoning for this was based on two factors; the need to guarantee Maori representation, and the desire to avoid intra-party competition.
It is interesting to note that, despite the wide use of majority-preferential voting in this country, the Commission did not see it as a satisfactory alternative (New Zealand Royal Commission, pp 30-31, para. s 2.70-2.72). [Back to text]
258. Geoffrey Palmer, "Timetable for Change" (Legislative Studies Quarterly, Autumn 1988), p 9. [Back to text]
259. Kirsty Milne, "Token gestures" (New Statesman and Society, 30 March 1990), pp 14-16. [Back to text]
260. Bogdanor, p 204. [Back to text]
261. Lakeman, pp 137-138. [Back to text]
262. Geoffrey Palmer, "Timetable for Change" (Legislative Studies Quarterly, Autumn 1988), p 10. [Back to text]
263. John Curtice, "Sense of proportion" (New Statesman, 11 February 1983, p 10). [Back to text]
264. New Zealand Royal Commission, p 52, para. s 2.135, 2.136. [Back to text]
265. Colin Tatz, "Aborigines and the White Problem" in Australian Politics: A Fourth Reader (ed Henry Mayer and Helen Nelson; Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1977).
In 1974, Bonner won 17,824 primary votes in his own right from third place on the Liberal/National Senate ticket. The number of Aborigines on the electoral roll in Queensland in 1973 was only 11,614 (of whom only 10,398 had voted in the elections for the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee); further, many of those who voted would have supported the Labor Party. So Bonner must have won many personal votes from outside the Aboriginal community. [Back to text]
266. Hoag and Hallett, pp 140-141. [Back to text]
267. "Duke of Avram wins seat for Libs in Lyons" (The Advocate, 29 May 1989). [Back to text]
268. Marsh, p 374. [Back to text]
269. Bogdanor, p 244. [Back to text]
270. Elections and Political Stability (1969); quoted by Gietzelt (November 1981), p 24. [Back to text]
271. Sharman, pp 106-107. [Back to text]
272. Wilson, p 10. [Back to text]
273. New Zealand Royal Commission, p 59, para. 2.162; Sharman, pp 93, 108. [Back to text]
274. Sharman, p 109. [Back to text]
275. Paul Kelly, "The Rising Tide of Senate Review." [Back to text]
276. Paul Kelly, "The Rising Tide of Senate Review." [Back to text]
277. Laurie Oakes, "Access makes the lucky country" (The Bulletin, 24 October 1989), p 31. [Back to text]
278. Mungo MacCallum, "Parliament's Political Safety Valve" (Australian Society, October 1986), p 28. [Back to text]
279. Townsley, p 41. [Back to text]
280. New Zealand Royal Commission, p 61, para. 2.168. [Back to text]
281. Townsley, p 66. [Back to text]
282. Bogdanor, p 248. [Back to text]
283. Wilson, p 7. [Back to text]
284. Ihlein, p 22. [Back to text]
285. Mary Holland, "Haughey pulls it off" (New Statesman, 11 February 1983), p 11. [Back to text]
286. Ihlein, p 20. [Back to text]
287. Ihlein, p 19. [Back to text]
288. Townsley, p 41. [Back to text]
289. Wilson, p 10. [Back to text]
290. Dean Jaensch, "Remaking the Australian Constitution", Current Affairs Bulletin, 1 December 1981, p 19. [Back to text]
291. Lakeman, p 161. [Back to text]
292. Irvine, p 86. [Back to text]
293. Lakeman, p 165. [Back to text]
294. Lakeman, p 158. [Back to text]
295. Some objectors (eg, Carstairs, pp 38; Gideon Doron and Richard Kronick, "Single Transferable Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function", American Journal of Political Science, May 1977, pp 303-311; William L Riker, Liberalism Against Populism, San Francisco, W H Freeman, 1982; p. 47) take great exception to STV's non-monotonicity - the fact that in some rare circumstances a candidate may be better off with fewer votes. This occurs under preferential voting in single-member electorates as well. For example, the National Party could lose a seat because its primary vote rose at the expense of the Labor Party, thus ensuring that it was the Labor, not the Liberal, candidate who came in third place and was eliminated. Labor preferences favour the Liberals, but Liberal preferences favour the Nationals.
Obviously this is a defect, but it must be kept in perspective. The only alternative to eliminating the lowest candidates and transferring their preferences is to allow victory on a split vote; this is more unjust, and much more obvious to the voters. Moreover, it is very rare that the non-monotonicity of preferential voting would affect the campaigning strategies of any party or candidate; it is hard to imagine a candidate consciously trying to win fewer votes.
Further, non-monotonicity is not inevitable; a candidate who has enough votes for a quota in his/her own right cannot be defeated. And finally, non-monotonicity appears in other systems in different forms. For example, under first-past-the-post the British Labour Party lost the 1951 election even though its total vote increased (and, in fact, it received more votes than any party at any British election before or since). [Back to text]
296. Hain and Hodgson, pp 22. [Back to text]
297. Mary Georghiou, letter to New Statesman and Society (27 October 1989, p 6). [Back to text]
298. Jesse, p 436. [Back to text]
299. Michael Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution (1988), p 257. [Back to text]