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QUOTA
 NOTES
Newsletter of the
Proportional Representation
Society of Australia
Number 76
December 1994 www.prsa.org.au
Late in the final
afternoon (8th December) of its
scheduled sittings, the second
ACT Legislative Assembly made
its first use, by a 16-1
majority, of its powers of
entrenchment under the
Commonwealth's Australian
Capital Territory
(Self-Government) Act 1998.
Eight days earlier,
Liberal MLA Mr Gary Humphries
had introduced the Proportional
Representation (Hare-Clark)
Entrenchment Bill 1994. It
sought to create a bulwark
against a simple majority of
MLAs ending the ACT's
quota-preferential voting and
counting, removing countback for
the filling of casual vacancies,
or tampering with Robson
Rotation. It also pre-empted
manipulation of the size of
electoral districts by parties
to suit their differential
patterns of support, by
requiring that each district
have an odd number of members -
5 or more.
ACT voters endorsed the
Hare-Clark option by a
resounding 2-1 majority at the
February 1992 plebiscite, but
that result was in no strict
sense binding. Indeed, last
December the Follett ALP
Government tried to undermine
the system by proposing party
boxes and other deceitful plans
aimed at replacing voter
influence with control for those
prominent within party machines.
Massive public uproar, and the
threat by two independent MLAs
to move a no-confidence motion
in the Chief Minister, who
introduced that legislation, had
her make a hasty backdown just
before Christmas 1993.
Under the Commonwealth
ACT Self-Government Act a
referendum or special Assembly
majority can be prescribed as
conditions of approval before
further changes can take effect,
but the Act to be subject to
those conditions must itself
meet them before it can take
effect. The importance of
entrenching key Hare-Clark
principles was recognized early,
but the introduction of
legislation to achieve it only
became possible in practice
after machinery provisions for
the conduct of referendums had
been established. Not
surprisingly, this matter has
not been a high priority of the
Follett Government.
A press release by the
Chief Minister said her
Government would move two
amendments to Mr Humphries'
Bill, to entrench
compulsory voting and
to require a referendum for any
change in the size of the
Assembly, should the
Commonwealth transfer power for
that. Ms Follett said, The
new system allows for local
representation and will ensure
close contact with the
community, which
heartened Hare-Clark supporters.
In a spirit of
compromise, both Government
amendments were carried, and Mr
Humphries could refine key
principles, set out in Section 4
of the Act shown on Page 4. The
MLAs supporting the Bill were
not entrenching the system that
elected them, but were
protecting ACT voters, 65% of
whom had voted for Hare-Clark in
1992. The only dissentient, Mr
Dennis Stevenson of the Abolish
Self-Government Coalition, had
long protested at the ACT as a
single electoral district not
having been a 1992 plebiscite
option. Having the previous day
said he would not stand again,
he indicated that the subject
matter did not trouble him, but
he thought the referendum should
be initiated by citizens as
opposed to politicians.
The ACT should soon be
ahead of Tasmania in that
Hare-Clark could be entrenched.
Also the ACT law uses the names
Hare-Clark and
Robson Rotation, which
gives them some helpful legal
status. To take effect, the Act
must be approved by a majority
of ACT electors on
18th February 1995, that is,
people enrolled rather than just
those casting a formal vote. If
it is approved, changes
inconsistent with the key
principles can only occur after
a further referendum, or by a
2/3 majority of the Assembly.
The Society's ACT
Branch again aims to play an
active role in the referendum
campaign, and will welcome
donations of money or offers
of assistance in distributing
materials. These can be sent
to the PRSA National Secretary
38 French Street HACKETT ACT
2602.
Following
recent elections under the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commission Act 1989, an
ATSIC Elections Review Panel, which
has responsibilities under Section
141 of the Act, has received a
Report from the Australian Electoral
Commission that has been rather
critical of the statutory use of
proportional representation as the
system of counting votes at those
elections. A PRSA submission to the
Review Panel, entitled Making Even
More Votes Fully Count, queried the
AEC Report's recommendation to
review PR. The AEC Report ended
saying, the PR method currently used
does not appear to be suitable for
ATSIC elections.
The AEC Report grumbled
about the high level of exhausted
ballots, but that was effectively
answered by the PRSA by its
recommendation that the procedures
for distribution of surpluses be
altered so that:
- the quota be
calculated in tenths or
hundredths
- only the last
parcel taking an elected
candidate beyond the quota be
eligible for further transfer
- the number of
transferable papers be the
divisor in the calculation of
the transfer value (with in all
cases the proviso that the value
not increase)
- deferment of
surplus distributions be
possible in appropriate
circumstances.
In its Report, the AEC, Australia's
electoral watchdog, even used a
Queensland local government election
precedent, where multiple
first-past-the-post elections are
used, to show how different the
outcome would be under that
procedure, which was abandoned, for
Senate elections, in 1919. No
explicit conclusion was drawn from
that illustration, and no warning
was given of its weaknesses, which
led to its abandonment for Senate
elections. Nevertheless its
inclusion, followed by a call for a
method that produces a quick and
accurate result seemed to point to a
wishful casting around for a change.
Malcolm Mackerras's
articles in the NZ newspaper, The
Dominion, (report in QN
75) attracted readers'
letters:
Although recognizing that STV
has merits, the voters and a
Royal Commission favoured
mixed member proportional in New
Zealand. At the time of our success
in the binding referendum on
(November 6), our reform society had
many messages of congratulations
from reform societies throughout the
world. However the approach from the
PRSA seemed very negative. The ERC
while having the priority of seeing
MMP up and running, supports STV for
Local Government.
It seems that Malcolm
Mackerras hasn't learnt from his
previous attacks on MMP. His
predictions on the binding
referendum were wrong. Why does Mr
Mackerras continue his attacks? Is
it because of a fear that MMP may be
better than STV? Is it that he is
closed minded about any alternative
proportional voting system?
In articles in The
Dominion newspaper, he makes
further predictions about the end of
MMP. I would have thought that he
would have steered clear of
predictions! Is he attempting to
ferment negative views toward MMP?
Malcolm queries the number of people
who understand MMP. It depends what
is meant by many but most people
realize the party vote determines
the overall percentage a party
achieves in Parliament. The split
vote, to vote both for a party of
choice and a local candidate, is a
tremendous advantage.
Mackerras claims MMP is so
stupid and so deceitful, but fails
to show how. He pushes emotive
buttons and includes titles such as
ratbag scheme. He slates the Royal
Commission as the Five Guilty
People. All they are guilty of is an
excellent analysis of electoral
system options and a recommendation
to implement MMP over STV as the
preferred system. The people did the
actual choosing in voting in two
electoral referenda. STV came a
distant second to MMP.
Mr Mackerras argues about
local representation. Good
candidates get voted in locally - no
problem! But modern politics is
about national parties who the
people elect to run the country -
not just a piece of country!
Mackerras suggests STV would
give representation according to
voter support. Under MMP, party
representation is guaranteed if a
party reaches the 5% threshold or
obtains an electorate seat. So MMP
doesn't leave representation to
chance like STV which can be
influenced by voter distribution.
The Five Guilty People are
the Royal Commission. Their work,
Towards A Better Democracy,
provides an educational tool for
those wishing to become informed
about electoral systems.
Mackerras
describes MMP as ill-researched, but
the New Zealand Royal Commission's 1986
report has been praised
internationally by political
scientists. On the other hand, the
Mackerras articles published in August
were described by one New Zealand
academic, Jonathan Boston, as
misguided and misleading, with
significant factual errors and
inconsistencies. They do a disservice
both to the New Zealand public and to
the discipline of political science.
Mackerras's slurs on
the Royal Commission and on MMP
include such descriptions as: a
ratbag electoral system -
deceitful, fraudulent, rotten,
stupid, vicious, and unfair. It
is disappointing that the PRSA
took seriously this writer's
abusive, extravagant and flawed
claims. MMP was proposed by an
independent panel after a
prolonged, public inquiry. It
was adopted by organizations
supporting electoral reform
throughout New Zealand,
including the Electoral Reform
Coalition. Despite a very
well-financed (and violently
abusive campaign against MMP by
the so-called Campaign for
Better Government, the public
voted clearly in favour of this
fair, proportional voting
system. Your Society should have
rejoiced in our success instead
of printing vicious and
inaccurate attacks on MMP.
Mackerras predicted that
Labour will be the victim of MMP
because it will be displaced by the
Alliance for reasons which are quite
unfair. The prediction is highly
speculative and the assertion of
unfairness is unfounded. Please note
that:
- It is too early to say that
Labour will be displaced by the
Alliance, as Labour is now ahead
in the polls.
- Even if Labour wins many
electorate seats (and thus is
granted few party seats), there is
nothing unfair about
this, providing that voters have
cast their party votes for their
choice of government. Enormous
efforts are already being made to
educate the public on using its
powerful party vote.
- The polls indicate Labour
is likely to benefit from tactical
voting in the constituencies. Even
the figures quoted by Mackerras
suggest maximum Labour-Alliance
vote-splitting of 6% - hardly
enough to destroy the
Labour Party
- 70 of the 99 Labour Party
candidates last year publicly
endorsed MMP. Labour voters were
overwhelmingly in favour of MMP.
Labour's MPs are committed
publicly to making MMP work. I
suggest that Mackerras's comments
on Labour's future under MMP can
and should be dismissed as a
combination of mischief-making and
wishful thinking.
Space
prevents a reply to the many other
misleading and inaccurate statements
in Mackerras's articles.
From
Mr Bogey Musidlak, National
President, Proportional
Representation Society of Australia,
Narrabundah, Australian Capital
Territory:
When you find your best arguments
being presented through a peculiar
filter, it is not unreasonable to
suspect incomprehension or systematic
bias.
While the New
Zealand Royal Commission did a
thorough job on the iniquities of first-past-the-post
voting (and then recommended its
partial retention!), it viewed the
single transferable vote very much
through a party-machine rather than
voter filter. First it thought of
STV only in party box terms,
although that is not how governments
have long been elected in Tasmania,
Eire and Malta, and now will be in
the ACT. Potential for strong voter
influence on who entered the ACT
Assembly was a major selling point
for Hare-Clark.
Next, the
Commission failed to recognise
countback to fill casual
vacancies as an important feature,
providing voters with greater
choice at a general election and
helping to preserve stability
through a Parliament's life.
Instead, its Report spoke of
replacement by party appointment,
and quite inexplicably of parties
needing time to get their
nomination strategies right. There
is nothing about STV which
requires artificial strategies.
Completing the
party machine straitjacket, the
Commission saw internal
competition within parties as
inherently bad. It lamely claimed
that STV could result in too much
emphasis on giving voters decent
service. It said it cannot
"rule out
the possibility that MPs elected
under STV might concentrate on
constituency work to the neglect of
their parliamentary functions."
STV keeps vote
wastage to a minimum. In its
Hare-Clark manifestations it
promotes voter involvement in
political debate without undermining
the capacity for effective party
government. That is why our
Society's Constitution
specifies our support for
quota-preferential methods.
List systems base
seat allocation on some averaging of
votes per elected member. They are
not concerned about the aggregate
levels of wasted votes, and
generally leave voters little say
about who enters Parliament. In
service, they have produced such
anomalies that many variants are in
use to try to achieve greater
fairness. No such tinkering has been
needed with quota-preferential
methods.
The ACT's twice-used
d'Hondt system was a butt of
constant public derision. The
local-member element of NZ's MMP
system is completely unsound. MMP
tries to correct its defects by a
second-rate (non-preferential)
device. Why would users of better
systems want MMP?
© 1994
Proportional Representation
Society of Australia
National
President: Bogey Musidlak, 14
Strzelecki Cr, NARRABUNDAH 2604
National Secretary:
Robert Forster (following John
Alexander's resignation) 38 French
Street HACKETT ACT 2602
Tel: (02) 6295 8137
(06) 9249 8546
info@prsa.org.au
Printed by Pink
Panther Instant Printing, 12
Pirie Street ADELAIDE
SA 5000
The Legislative Assembly for
the Australian Capital Territory
enacts as follows:
- Short title
- 1. This Act may be cited
as the Proportional
Representation (Hare-Clark)
Entrenchment Act 1994.
- Commencement
- 2. This Act commences on
the day on which it is notified
in the Gazette.
- Interpretation
- 3. Unless the contrary
intention appears, expressions
used in this Act have the same
meanings as in the Electoral Act
1992.
- Entrenchment of electoral
system
- 4.
- (1)
- This Act applies to
any law that is inconsistent
with any of the following
principles of the
proportional representation
(Hare-Clark) electoral
system:
- (a)
- at a general
election, an odd number
of members of the
Legislative Assembly
shall be elected from
each electorate;
- (b)
- at a general
election, at least 5
members of the
Legislative Assembly
shall be elected from
each electorate;
- (ba)
- voting in an
election shall be
compulsory;
- (c)
- each voter has the
right to a fully
preferential vote;
- (d)
- squares for the
indication of
preferences on each
ballot paper shall
appear only alongside
the names of individual
candidates;
- (e)
- a voter shall not
be taken to have marked
any preferences beyond
the numbers, starting
with "1" for the
candidate with the first
reference, marked by the
voter in the squares
alongside the names of
individual candidates;
- (f)
- ballot papers
shall be -
- (i)
- prepared and
collated in
accordance with the
method known as the
Robson Rotation; and
- (ii)
- distributed
and issued; as set
out in Schedule 2 to
the Electoral Act
1992, being that
Schedule as in force
on 1 December 1994;
- (g)
- a candidate whose
total votes equal or
exceed a relevant quota
as defined in Schedule 4
to the Electoral Act
1992, being that
Schedule as in force on
1 December 1994, shall
be declared elected;
- (h)
- unless the number
of successful candidates
is equal to the number
of vacancies, any
surplus votes for a
successful candidate
shall be transferred to
continuing candidates in
accordance with the next
available preferences
indicated on ballot
papers that were counted
for the successful
candidate;
- (j)
- if there are no
surpluses to be
distributed, the
candidate with the least
total votes shall be
excluded and the ballot
papers counted for the
excluded candidates
shall be transferred to
continuing candidates in
accordance with the next
available preference, if
any, indicated on each
ballot paper;
- (k)
- where there are 2
or more eligible
candidates in relation
to a casual vacancy, the
vacancy shall be filled
by a recount of the
ballot papers counted
for the person who, at
the last election before
the vacancy occurred,
was elected to the seat
in which the vacancy has
occurred.
- (2)
- This Act applies to
any law made pursuant to a
power at any time vested in
the Legislative Assembly to
make a law with respect to
the number of members of the
Legislative Assembly.
- Special procedures for
making certain enactments
- 5.
- (1)
- This Act, or any
amendment or repeal of this
Act, has no effect unless -
- (a)
- it is passed by at
least a 2/3 majority of
the members of the
Legislative Assembly;
and
- (b)
- it is passed by a
majority of electors at
a referendum held in
accordance with the
Referendum (Machinery
Provisions) Act 1994.
- (2)
- A law to which this
Act applies by virtue of
section 4 has no effect
unless it is passed by -
- (a)
- the Legislative
Assembly and passed by a
majority of electors at
a referendum held in
accordance with the
Referendum (Machinery
Provisions) Act 1994; or
- (b)
- at least a 2/3
majority of the members
of the Legislative
Assembly.
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