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Proportional
Representation Society of Australia |
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www.prsa.org.au |
Tel +61429176725 |
2020-03-13 |
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Inadvisability
of constraints in proportional representation
elections |
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Examples of
Imposition of Constraints: An early example of a
constraint applied to override and distort a winner-take-all
outcome is the provision in the 12th Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution that requires
that an elector is constrained in his or her votes
for President and Vice-President by having to
vote, in at least one of those ballots, for a
candidate that is resident in a State other than
the one in which he or she is resident. More
recent examples include the constraint that Section 28(a) of the
Constitution of the Liberal Party of Australia
places on the sex of two of the Vice-Presidents of
its Federal Council, whereby one must be a male
and one a female.
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Confusion
about What Constitutes Representation: There is, possibly based
on the secondary rather than the primary
dictionary definition of the word "representation",
an unfortunate confusion between representing the
opinions and the will of voters, and merely
representing their more obvious characteristics,
such as their sex and age, which are not
necessarily representative of what they stand for,
or how they are likely to act in office. That
confusion leads to a
belief in some quarters that the outcome
of an election should be more predetermined than
it would be if it were left to the voters to the
greatest extent possible. This confusion leads to
proposals for a requirement that there should be
an equal number of
males and females in parliaments
despite voters having other priorities, as
evidenced by their actual votes. This attitude of
constraining voters completely overlooks the fact
that, in some circumstances, or for a particular
election, a large number of male voters might
prefer to have females as their representatives or
vice-versa, as those voters see fit, and that transferable
voting can implement that.
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Preferable
Way to Represent a Spectrum of Voters'
Viewpoints: A far fairer way to enable a
representative body to more faithfully match the
spectrum of views of those voting to elect its
members is to couple the maximum use of a PR-STV
system of proportional representation with the
minimum use of devices that arbitrarily
or subtly distort voters' preferences.
The history of Australian Senate ballot-paper
designs demonstrates various such
devices that have been superimposed on Australia's
electoral systems. One such device is Group
Voting Tickets, which have
fortunately been discontinued for the Senate, and
the Legislative Councils of NSW and South
Australia, but not yet Western Australia or
Victoria.
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