"... the electoral system is bound to play a major role in shaping the political system, by influencing the attitudes of parties to government, of legislators to their parties and to the electorate, and of voters to those who represent them." [302]We can reasonably predict, from our study of electoral systems, how these features will operate in practice: "Things never work out quite as expected, but that is no reason for not attempting to create a rational structure in the first place." [303] (emphasis added)
The level of proportionality increases with more seats [see Appendix IV]; but with over nine seats, this increased accuracy is overshadowed by the complexity of the ballot-paper and the large size of the electorate. Five to nine, then, is the optimum number.
Each electorate should have an uneven number of MPs; otherwise there is a risk that a closely-balanced election will result in a tie between the majority and minority parties. (It is for this reason that Tasmania changed from six- to seven-member electorates in 1956). If there is a majority in the electorate, it should win a majority of seats.
One version of Hare-Clark commonly proposed [306] or used [307] (probably because it would make it harder for minor parties to win seats) [308] requires three-member electorates in sparsely-populated areas and five-member electorates in densely-populated areas. However, this. model could well have an "inbuilt bias towards the country." [309] A party with 50% of the votes in a rural electorate wins two seats out of three; a party with 50% in an urban electorate wins only three seats out of five. We would recommend only one three-member electorate at most, which would render any such bias insignificant.
If the number of MPs varies from electorate to electorate, then parties which are stronger in the smaller electorates will be advantaged. [310] This has been particularly blatant in Éire. But any such advantage is greatly reduced with five or more MPs per electorate; as the graph in Appendix IV shows, a system based on five-, seven-, and nine-member electorates would produce a closely proportional result. The manipulation in Éire resulted from the juggling of three- and four-seat electorates, which our proposed system would not allow.
[The submission then went on to suggest a rough model of electorates, assuming for simplicity that each would be a simple amalgamation of 9, 7, 5 or (in just one case) 3 of the 89 districts as they existed in 1990. This has been omitted as the electoral districts and boundaries are now quite different.]
It is most consistent with democratic principle that voters should be left free to decide for themselves how many preferences to put down. Voters should not have to record (say) a 32nd or 33rd preference, or vote for a candidate they do not wish to support, in order to have their more important first and second preferences accepted.
Optional-preferential voting would reduce the "disturbingly high level of informality" seen in some elections, such as the Senate; [311] for this reason it has been supported by the Australian Electoral Commission. [312]
By making it easier to cast a formal vote, optional preferences would reduce ordinary voters' dependence on party how-to-vote cards. At present there is a widespread but incorrect belief, which the parties do nothing to discourage, that a vote is not valid unless it follows a party ticket. No longer will voters be exhorted to "Copy Numbers Exactly" under fear that they will mess up their vote if they do otherwise. Thus, it would encourage voters to make their own choice among candidates, within and across parties.
It would be undemocratic and unacceptable to actually restrict the number of preferences any voter can give; but by making it possible that the vote could be "split" (though not against the will of any voter), it reduces the minor parties' power to direct their supporters' preferences.
Such directions would have effect only if the voters positively favoured them. Moreover, no longer would parties like the Australian Democrats automatically get every other party's second preferences. [313]
Optional preferential voting has been opposed by the conservative parties as equivalent to first-past-the-post. This may have some relevance in a single-member electorate, if two conservative candidates are facing a single Labor candidate; but in a five-member electorate, there may well be four National, three Liberal and five Labor candidates, so each party will be equally affected by the splitting of the vote. Further, Tasmanian experience shows that around one-third of voters record a full list of preferences for all candidates; only a very small percentage take advantage of the minimum requirement to number 7 candidates. [314]
It is odd that the conservative parties seem to fear that they can't persuade their supporters to swap preferences among the coalition partners without the electoral law compelling them to do so.
Even if votes run out of preferences and are set aside as exhausted, they can be regarded as having deliberately chosen to abstain; [315] and the loss of these votes would be balanced by a lower level of informal votes. [316] Exhausted votes are at least included in the count as far as they show preferences; informal votes are not included in the count at all.
There is no need for the instructions on the ballot-paper to specifically mention that voters can leave squares blank. A simple instruction such as "Number all the candidates in the order of your preference" would ensure that most voters complied. At the same time, if any do not they should not have their votes rejected. Each vote should be counted as valid until preferences ran out or a mistake was reached. This is similar in intent to the current Federal electoral rules, where voters are exhorted to number all the candidates but the ballot is still accepted even if the last candidate is left unnumbered.
In Tasmania, the system has encouraged voters to make their own choices within the parties. [320] As a result (although each major party is certain of winning three or four of the seven seats in each electorate) there are no safe seats for individual candidates. [321] And, according to the Tasmanian Electoral Office, there is virtually no donkey-vote. [322] Tasmanian candidates often poll significantly different numbers of primary votes.
By contrast, in the Senate - where the order of candidates is stage-managed by the political parties - there has been no instance in forty years of enough voters defying the recommended order of candidates on their party's ticket for it to be upset. [323] (There was some media prediction in 1980 that Flo Bjelke-Petersen might miss out on a seat, despite her first place on the Nationals' Senate ticket, because National voters would resent her promotion over sitting Senators; however, the drift in personal votes was not enough to change the result, [324] and since the introduction of party-box voting in 1984 the possibility of such a grass-roots revolt has become even more remote).
If rotation were introduced, the voters who made their own choice among candidates rather than donkey-voting might be few at first; but it would be their votes that decided which individual candidates won. As more and more voters, over time, come to realise that they can influence the election result more directly by making their own choices, they too would cease to donkey-vote. With a free choice among major-party candidates, fewer voters would turn to minor-party candidates.
Even if the vast majority of voters do not take the opportunity to make their own choice, and continue to donkey-vote down the party group, rotation can, in some circumstances, help the major parties in another way.
When candidates' order on the ballot is stage-managed, the top candidates on each ticket receive a huge surplus of primary votes, but the bottom candidates receive so few votes that they are excluded from the count. As the example below indicates (assuming A and B are two major-party candidates, and C a minor-party candidate), the major party can sometimes be better off if its votes are divided equally among its candidates, not "tied up" in a quota obtained "too early" by A when they could have saved B from defeat by C.
Case 1: Order of candidates determined by party; donkey-vote, or "above-the-line" vote, favours first candidate on major-party ticket, whose (smallish) surplus flows to B. Result: B still has less votes than C, and is eliminated before C.
Case 2: Order of major-party candidates rotated; donkey-vote favours both candidates equally. Result: C eliminated before B.
At first this may seem like deliberate manipulation of the system, but it should be stressed that this equalisation of votes benefits the larger parties only when the last seat at stake is doubtful and has to be decided on preferences, and only when the average vote of the major party's remaining candidates (here A and B) is greater than that of their minor-party rival. When a party has a quota of votes in its own right, equalisation of its opponents' votes cannot deny it a seat. Here C did not have a quota in his/her own right, so it was possible that B was entitled to the seat ahead of C.
In Éire (where ballot order is alphabetical) each party actually tries to divide the electorate among its voters so as to secure equal numbers of votes for all its candidates; [326] but with rotation under Hare-Clark, these manoeuvrings are unnecessary.
If rotation is thought to be too complicated or expensive, then we would recommend that candidates' positions be determined by lot. Senator Gietzelt [327] proposed placement by lot instead of rotation, so as to make it easier for voters to follow parties' how-to-vote cards. We would accept it for the opposite reason - as a second-best alternative to rotation, in preference to party-ranking, to make it harder for voters to accept party dictation.
Placement by lot has one advantage over rotation (if the arguments against intra-party competition cited above are thought persuasive); candidates' order of election can be decided impartially, without either party patronage or competition among candidates. [328]
Also, we consider ticket-voting to be demeaning to voters and particularly objectionable with the requirement (as in Senate elections) of compulsory full preferences. To vote a party's way, voters need only put down a "1"; to vote their own way they must put down twenty or thirty numbers, omitting or repeating none, with little concession for human frailty in the rules for formality. This, of course, makes it easier for voters to do what the parties want them to do, and difficult to vote formally otherwise. "Ticket-voting carries one step further the attitude long engendered by how-to-vote cards, whereby electors are invited to let parties do their thinking for them." [329]
The obvious solution is optional preferences; If voting itself were simplified, the voters' need of assistance might decrease. [330]
The New Zealand Royal Commission was confident that the rigid effects of ticket-voting would be balanced by the ability, even if unexercised, of voters to number candidates individually; "A sizeable group of voters within a constituency might use the preference option to elect a favoured candidate or to block the election of one they oppose." [331]
But in real life, "... the 'don't knows', by supporting the party's list, tend to swamp the choices of the 'politically educated.'" [332]
Ticket-voting contributes to political apathy. Many voters do not know or realise where their preference will end up. "Certainly, the parties' registered preferences were displayed in each polling place. But how many voters read this, and considered its implications, before casting a vote? Further, when a party registered two different preference allocations, the voter could not, and did not, know to whom the preferences were distributed." [333]
This is illustrated by an example given by Senator Brian Harradine; "... soon after the last election ... I went to a timber industry establishment - one of the factories dealing with the pulp and paper industry - and said to a few of my mates: 'How did the election go? I suppose you put a number one in the Labor Party box?' 'Oh, yes, Brian', they replied. I said; 'Congratulations. You have just elected Norm Sanders.' This is no reflection against Senator Sanders, but the fact is that everybody knows that he is a strong opponent of wood-chipping ... How many electors involved in the hydro-electric, timber, and such industries knew that, by placing a number one in the Labor Party box, they in fact elected Norm Sanders?" [334]
The same criticism of the Senate system has been made by Clyde Holding; "... seats may literally be decided by chance, on the preferences of voters who may well have had no idea - or wish - that their vote would elect particular candidates." [335]
[* This can be manipulated by parties and candidates: "... republicans claimed monarchist supporters were trying to mislead voters in Queensland through their preference allocations. The ARM's lead candidate and former attorney-general Michael Lavarch said a group called Elect The President had directed their first preferences to constitutional monarchists ahead of republican candidates. He said the group, headed by former National Party media officer Clive Palmer should explain how it could achieve its stated aim by directing votes to a group that wanted to retain the Crown. "With so many unknown groups and individuals nominated for this election, this action by Mr Palmer can only be seen as a way of manipulating and confusing voters," Mr Lavarch said." ["Republic debate sinks in a sea of racism, hate mail", by Matthew Spencer and Fiona Kennedy: Weekend Australian, 18-19 October 1997, p 3]. TJR, 10.11.99.]
Also, the voters' decision to give preferences to another party is an important opportunity to endorse a pre-poll coalition between parties. [336]
We are not opposed to how-to-vote cards as such. (However, we consider them a shameful waste of paper when it would be easier to display each party's ticket behind glass in the polling booth, as in South Australia). [337] Even politically-sophisticated voters may like to see how the parties recommend their supporters vote.
If a party machine can succeed in persuading voters to stick strictly to its how-to-vote order when the ballot is not stage-managed in its favour, good luck to it. But if the order of candidates on the ballot (whether random or rotated) does not correspond with that on the how-to-vote card, then voters will begin to question why they should "copy numbers exactly."
There may be some benefit in also allowing bodies other than political parties and candidates to register (perhaps upon payment of a fee or deposit) their how-to-vote tickets, to be displayed in the booth as well, so they do not have to run their own candidates (thereby crowding the ballot) just to have the fight to register their how-to-vote ticket (or, under the current system, their party box).
A Senate Select Committee in 1950 recommended in favour of the recount system. [338]
The recount system widens voters' choice by encouraging parties to put up extra candidates. It can also make competition among candidates less divisive; the loser may have a second chance to fill a vacant seat later in the parliamentary term. [339]
It is sometimes objected that the replacement chosen through a recount may not be of the same party as the vacating member. (For example, the recount to replace Tasmanian Democrat MHA Norm Sanders elected not another Democrat but a Green Independent, Bob Brown).
Such changes are rare; but even when they do occur, their effect is no different from the current system, where the opposition may take a seat from the government at a by-election. They reflect the wishes of the voters; no democrat can complain about that.
It is argued that by-elections must be retained as they allow voters to send a message to the government. If so, then this message is fairly indistinct, since most by-elections go heavily against the governing party, whatever its complexion. The Hare-Clark system's provision for free choice of candidates allows all voters to send a message to the government at every election, in the way they choose candidates within and across parties. This is more effective than voters simply hoping that their local member will die or resign so that they can give the ruling party a kick in the pants.
The appointment system can be criticised on democratic grounds. [340] The stage-managed electoral system has already seriously weakened Senators' links with voters, but for an appointed Senator such links are non-existent. A candidate never approved by the voters can still end up in Parliament (without even showing that s/he is next preferred by the vacating member's supporters).
Also, the procedure is wrought with legal and political controversy. It is still open to contention, 14 years after the referendum to amend Section 15 of the Constitution was passed, whether a State Parliament must by law or convention rubber-stamp the political party's nominee. [341]
The Commonwealth Electoral Act's provisions regulating the registration of parties and the use of party labels have worked without problems for the past three Federal elections.
For those voters who want to support non-party candidates, this reform would enable them to identify and vote against those representing political parties.
In Britain, the electoral law lets candidates adopt any designation they choose (subject to obscenity laws and a limit of six words). By convention, most candidates use simply "Independent" or the name of the party endorsing them. However, occasionally one might stand as, for example, "Anti-Common Market Conservative." There could be merit in having such a flexible rule (provided that no candidate could so use a registered party's name without its endorsement) for Hare-Clark elections, so that candidates of the same party could distinguish themselves as, say, "ALP Socialist Left" or "dry Liberal" or "Gold Coast National."
However, we believe, on grounds of democratic principle, that ideally the ratio of voters to representatives should be within ± 10% of the average in every electorate. The purpose of Hare-Clark is to ensure that all votes will be of equal value; this implies that all voters should be of equal value.
Also, with an equal state-wide voter ratio, there will be less wrangling over redistributions. There will be no more arguments over how many seats each area of the State "deserves."
Since under Hare-Clark rural electorates will be three or five times larger in area anyway, there is little point in trying to keep them small in area by over-representing their voters. On the other hand, as we have argued above, even with such larger electorates Hare-Clark will still ensure close links between MPs and their constituents and a voice for the remote rural areas.
301. Sharman, pp 105, 107. [Back to text]
302. Bogdanor, p 210. [Back to text]
303. Colin Howard, The Constitution, Power, and Politics (1980), pp 61-62. [Back to text]
304. Harrop and Miller, p 49. Because (under most list systems) there is no transfer of preferences, votes can be "wasted" if split among too many different lists. Thus, to produce a proportional result, list systems need a larger number of representatives per electorate (around ten, as opposed to five) than do quota-preferential systems. [Back to text]
305. However, a limited number of three-member electorates - one or two at the most - may be justifiable in very remote rural areas. [Back to text]
306. Buchanan, p 15; Gietzelt (July 1981), p 60; William Yandell Elliott, The Need for Constitutional Reform: A Program for National Security (New York, Whittlesey House, 1935), pp 35, 194; also proposed (with a list system) for Quebec in 1979 (Irvine, p 75). [Back to text]
307. In New South Wales, 1918-1932 (Hughes, p 224; Wright, p 122), the Republic of Ireland, and the Japanese House of Representatives. However, in the last two, some of the electorates have four seats. [Back to text]
308. Hughes, p 23. [Back to text]
309. Ray, p 129. [Back to text]
310. Hain and Hodgson, p 15; Ray, p 127. [Back to text]
311. Ray, p 133. [Back to text]
312. Paul Austin, "Complex Senate poll 'should be changed'" (Weekend Australian, 15-16 July 1989). [Back to text]
313. Gietzelt (November 1981), p 41. [Back to text]
314. Gietzelt (July 1981), p 44. [Back to text]
315. Bogdanor, p 240. [Back to text]
316. Ray, p 140. [Back to text]
317. Ideally, the order of groups could be rotated as well. However, in practice, this is not essential, as (1) it makes for extra complication, and (2) political parties are generally better-known, and thus much less influenced by the donkey vote, than are individual candidates. [Back to text]
318. There are different ways to achieve this end. New York City in the 1930s used the simple rule of ABCD, BCDA, CDAB, DABC, and so on. Tasmania's Electoral Act, on the other hand, sets out a complex but more mathematically-precise formula designed to eliminate the former advantage some candidates gained in being placed immediately after a popular candidate (as B is placed after A in three-quarters of the ballot versions, under the New York method). [Back to text]
319. Bogey Musidlak, "Making the most of your support" (Good Government, June 1984), p 6. [Back to text]
320. Hughes, p 313. [Back to text]
321. Townsley, p 66. [Back to text]
322. Sharman, pp 106, 112. [Back to text]
323. David Butler, "Electoral systems", in Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections (1981), p 8; Sharman, p 104. [Back to text]
324. Hughes, p 233. [Back to text]
325. Carstairs, pp 14-23. [Back to text]
326. Bogdanor, p 246. [Back to text]
327. Gietzelt (July 1981), p 62. [Back to text]
328. As suggested for the Greypower movement by K B Morgan (letter to The Bulletin, 13 June 1989, p 17). [Back to text]
329. Joan Rydon, "Votes, dirty tricks, and absurdities" (Australian Society, November 1985), pp 14-16. [Back to text]
330. Rydon, p 14. [Back to text]
331. New Zealand Royal Commission, pp 51, 54, para. s 2.130, 2.144. [Back to text]
332. Marsh, p 377. [Back to text]
333. Jaensch, p 164. [Back to text]
334. Brian Harradine (Ind, Tas), Hansard, Senate, 18 February 1987, pp 196-7. [Back to text]
335. Clyde Holding (ALP, Melbourne Ports), Hansard, House of Representatives, 19 October 1988, pp 196-197. However, Mr Holding was criticising the Senate system while advocating the d'Hondt party-list system, which has exactly the same defect. [Back to text]
336. New Zealand Royal Commission, p 56, para. 2.152. [Back to text]
337. Ihlein, p 22. [Back to text]
338. Gietzelt (November 1981), p 30. [Back to text]
339. It has been commented that intra-party competition is less intense in Tasmania than in Éire (New Zealand Royal Commission, p. 54, para. 2.143); one plausible reason could be that vacancies are filled through a recount in Tasmania, but through by-elections in Éire. [Back to text]
340. Editorial, The Canberra Times (6 March 1980). [Back to text]
341. Bruce Montgomery, "Gray backs Democrat for Senate in 'farcical' sitting" (The Australian, 11 April 1990). [Back to text]