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Proportional Representation Society
of Australia |
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5.
Group Voting
Tickets - discontinued
in March 2016
- badly
distorted
Senate PR-STV:
That
Bill did
not even
restore the
fixed number
of preferences
required for a
valid vote (twice
the number of
senators to be
elected, plus
one) that
existed
before the Commonwealth
Electoral Act
1934
replaced that
with a
requirement to
mark
preferences
for all
candidates,
regardless of
how many there
might be,
which survived
little-changed
to play havoc
with Senate
voting, until
that was
changed in
March 2016. The
minister
introducing
the 1983 Bill,
the Hon. Kim
Beazley MHR,
delivered his
second reading
speech
supporting the
Bill. Dr
Richard
Klugman MHR,
the Chair of
the Joint
Select
Committee on
Electoral
Reform - whose
1983
Report had
been
influential in
the drafting
of the Bill -
supported him.
Dr Klugman
claimed that
the Liberal
Party had
lodged a
submission
supporting
Group Voting
Tickets
(confusingly
referred to as
"list
voting"),on
the proviso
that the
tickets had to
indicate the
preferences
for all
candidates. The
Group Voting
Tickets
provision
existed from
1983 until the
Turnbull
Liberal
Government,
with the
support of the
Greens Party
senators and
South
Australian
Senator Nick
Xenophon, repealed it in
March 2016
and also
replaced the
virtually full
preferential
formality
provision that
had existed
since 1934
with a partial
optional
preferential
provision.
Group Voting
Tickets were
introduced in
1983 with the
joint support
of the
Australian
Labor Party
and the
Australian
Democrats, but
were,
notwithstanding
Dr Klugman's
claim above,
opposed at the
outset
in the House
of
Representatives
by the
Coalition
Opposition.
Speakers
against the
provision
included Hon.
Steele Hall
MHR. The
Coalition
senators and
the
independent
Senator Brian
Harradine also
opposed it.
In his 1983 Senate speech, in
which he
included a letter
from the PRSA
President,
Victorian
Liberal Senator
Alan Missen
referred to
his concerns
about the ALP
Government's
Group Voting
Ticket
proposal, as
did NSW
Liberals, Senator
Sir John
Carrick
and Senator
Peter Baume,
the National
Party's Senate
Leader Senator
Douglas Scott
of NSW, the
Nationals
Queensland Senator
Florence
Bjelke-Petersen,
and Tasmanian
independent Senator
Brian
Harradine.
Surprisingly,
the then ALP Senator
Malcolm
Colston
pointed to the
quite unreasonable
imposition
that the
existing full
preferential
marking
requirement
placed on
voters, but he
did not
explain why
the Government
was to
continue the
use of that
system,
leaving it as
the only
alernative to
the above-the-line
voting
proposed,
until it was
discontinued in 2016. ALP Senators Gareth
Evans and
Graham
Maguire,
and Australian
Democrats Senator
Jack Evans,
each spoke in
support of
Group Voting
Tickets. The
resulting above-the-line
Group Voting
Tickets
were part of a
history
of
ballot-paper
designs
for
preferential
voting in
Senate
elections that
began in 1919.
It involved
stage-managed
ballot paper
design that
was made even
less
even-handed -
to better suit
party
organizations
-
in 1940.
Those designs
saw a system
evolve that
the reforms of
March 2016
have not
entirely
eliminated. Nearly all voters at Senate elections have been inveigled into just endorsing their party's ticket without needing to be persuaded of the merits of its individual candidates or - until the 2016 reforms - other candidates, as the direct election provision in the Constitution envisaged, rather than the far more participatory approach of considering the relative merits of the various candidates and choosing the order of preference among them explicitly, as fortunately still occurs with Hare-Clark. That hyperlink shows that Tasmania's Parliament rejected Group Voting Tickets, so first preference votes at its Assembly elections are not highly concentrated on just two candidates, as occurs at Senate elections, leaving almost all elected senators gaining only a tiny number of first preference votes, which can disadvantage major parties. Tasmania uses partial optional preferential voting and Robson Rotation for both State houses, and for municipal elections. That
concentration
of first
preference
votes
on a single
candidate of a
party, which
Dr H V Evatt
called regimentation
of the vote,
preceded Group
Voting Tickets
and even the
Senate's
proportional
representation
system. It now
perversely and
unfairly
increases
minor party
representation
at the expense
of that of the
major parties,
as described
in a 1988
article
in The
Canberra
Times, but
that seems
either not to
be understood
by the
parties, or
their
operatives
prefer instead
to sacrifice
some
representation
in order to
retain their
power of
controlling
the order in
which
candidates
appear on Group
Voting Tickets,
or how-to-vote
cards, rather
than avoiding
their loss
by using Robson
Rotation.
That folly of the major parties
let Jacquie
Lambie, of the
new Palmer
United Party,
win the sixth
Senate seat at
Tasmania's
2013 polls
when less
concentration
of the Liberal
first
preference
vote on just
one of its
candidates
would have
seen a third
Liberal
winning that
last seat
instead of
her. Most
parties' how-to-vote
cards urged
voters not to
vote below-the-line,
as that would
give effect to
voters' rather
than parties'
wishes. With a
new record
number of
Senate
candidates
(110 in NSW in
2013)
stimulated by
the
unprecedented
power that
Group Voting
Tickets let
voters
delegate to
party
machines, it
became very
difficult for
many actual
and would-be below-the-line
voters to
comply with
the extremely
arduous
demands of the
unneccessary
formality
provision of
full marking
of all
preferences
being required
for a formal
ballot. A
ballot
correctly
marked for the
number of
seats to be
filled should
be enough for
a formal
ballot, but
even a single
first
preference is
better than an
informal
ballot.
Anthony Green
explained the
role
of Group
Voting Tickets
in electing
candidates of
certain
micro-parties
at the 2013
Senate
election. Group Voting Tickets also led to candidates of very small parties being elected as a result of several larger parties all placing them at relatively high positions on their tickets and thus having them elected, when it is clear that their total vote without that support would have left them unelected. An example of that was the 2004 election of Victorian Senator Steve Fielding of the Family First Party, with only 1.85% of first preference votes gained by him, with his eventually-attained quota of 14.29% consisting of those first preference votes, plus 12.44% of the overall vote as valid transfers to him from votes for other candidates in his party (0.03%), plus other candidates outside his party whose progress totals in the count remained lower than his throughout the count (12.41%), and who were unsuccessful. Senator Helen Coonan's misconceived threshold proposal to prevent this consequence of persisting with the concept of Group Voting Tickets was unfair, and was fortunately never implemented. The
percentage of
below-the-line
Senate voters
in NSW and
Victoria
reached about
4%, but in the
two Senate
electorates
where Hare-Clark
is used for
Assembly
elections,
Tasmania and
the A.C.T, the
awareness by
many voters of
the merits of
an untramelled
quota-preferential
PR with Robson
Rotation
kept the below-the-line
vote at a far
healthier
figure of
about 20%,
which helped
avert some of
the worst
effects of
Group Voting
Tickets in
distorting
electoral
outcomes. Group Voting Tickets'
discrimination
against voters
that do not
want to vote
that way or
that do not
investigate
the preference
order they
represent, and
those tickets'
consequent
undermining of
the
Constitution's
ideal of direct
elections
justified
abandoning
this
distorting
influence on
Australia's
democracy.
Informal
voting is far
more
satisfactorily
reduced by
moving from
the Senate's
virtually full
preferential
voting to at
least a partial
optional
preferential
system. Challenge in the
High Court, to
one aspect of
Group
Voting Tickets
in the
important, but
inadequately
resourced, 1984 case
of Cyril John
McKenzie
failed. A 2016
article in The
Canberra Times
advocated a
new, properly
resourced
challenge that
would feature
the weaknesses
that some 30
years of use
of group
voting tickets
has revealed.
The 1999
case of D K
Ditchburn
also failed. Above-the-line
Senate voters'
task was far
less onerous,
and they were
far less
likely to vote
informally,
than below-the-line
voters, as
formal above-the-line
votes required
just a single
mark, whereas
below-the-line
votes had to
have nearly
every box
marked
correctly. Voters
for ungrouped
candidates,
whose names
could appear below-the-line
only, were
discriminated
against - as
were those
candidates -
as the
electoral law
denied such
voters the
convenience of
an above-the-line
vote, and they
could cast a
formal vote
only by
consecutively
marking
preferences
for nearly all
the
candidates,
whose number
exceeded 100
in some Senate
elections.
Partial
optional
preferential
voting below-the-line,
which has long
applied for
NSW Upper
House polls,
now also
applies for
Victoria's Legislative
Council
and, since
March 2016, to
the Senate. An
aspect of the Group Voting Tickets
provisions that was not raised by
litigants in the above High Court
challenges,
but would seem to be in marked
conflict with the direct
election requirements of Section
7 of the Constitution, and
could have been the subject of a
future such challenge, is that Section
272(2) and Section 272 (3)
of the Commonwealth Electoral
Act 1918 allowed a group to
lodge two or three different
tickets, to which effect had to be
given at the scrutiny in
accordance with that Section by a
random allocation of ballot-papers
that allot that ticket to each of
the two or three groups equally.
Section 272(4) and Section
272(5) made provision for
cases where such effect cannot be
given for any reason (which
might include a successful High
Court challenge). That
latter sub-section provided that,
in such cases, later preferences -
beyond the point where the earlier
preferences are identical for all
relevant ballot-papers - had to be
disregarded and be of no effect.
No elector voting in that way
could be certain that his or her
vote - beyond the point at which
the preferences in corresponding
multiple Tickets differed - would
directly elect any of the
candidates there, whereas it might
have if that provision for
multiple Tickets had not existed.
Senator Robert Ray spoke
on this matter in the
Senate. Western
Australia, which is alone
among the States in having a
constitutional requirement for
direct election, has chosen to
provide for single Group Voting
Tickets only. The
Greens
Party leader,
Senator Bob
Brown, introduced
his Commonwealth
Electoral
(Above-the-Line
Voting)
Amendment Bill
2008
in a failed
bid to have
the above
style of above-the-line
voting
replaced with
a system where
above-the-line
voters would,
for a valid
vote, indicate
their
preference
between groups
by numbers in
the squares above-the-line.
See
Senator
Brown's second
reading speech.
Each square
would relate
to its party's
candidates
only, in an
order the
party lodged,
and no party
or group could
lodge a
preference
order to be
given effect
to except for
the candidates
of that party,
rather than
the
predetermined
ordering of a
voter's entire
ballot that
Senate Group
Voting Tickets
used to
entail. The
Greens'
Bill would
have greatly
undermined the
ostensible rationale for introducing those Group Voting
Tickets, which
was to
minimize
informal
ballots and
avoid
exhausted
ballots, even
at the expense
of assuming,
implausibly,
that each above-the-line
voter would
know where his
or her
preferences
were actually
being
transferred.
The NSW Act, since
1999, has
provided
that the
marking of
later
preferences in
above-the-line
party squares
is fully
optional, but
in Bob Brown's
Bill such
marking was
partially
optional, as
normally four
party squares
would have to
be marked for
an above-the-line
vote to be
formal, which
would have
increased the
incidence of
informal
ballots. In each of those above-the-line
cases, unlike
the Senate Group Voting System introduced in 1983, many
above-the
line ballots
were likely to
become
exhausted. For
below-the-line
votes, Bob
Brown's Bill
required full
preferential
marking,
unlike the NSW
Act, which
has always
provided, as
has
Victoria's,
for partial
optional
preferential
voting. The Bill
failed to move
towards even
partial
optional
preferential
voting for below-the-line
voters. Once
the
manipulative
effects of above-the-line
voting became
strikingly
evident at the
2013
elections,
Bob Brown presented
a case for
his 2008 Bill
to be pursued,
but that
showed no
improvements
for, but
discrimination
against, those
choosing to vote directly for other than tickets, who can
only vote
below-the-line.
Bob Brown
erred when he
suggested that
below-the-line
voting could
be abolished,
as the High
Court has
declared
that it must
be retained in
order to
comply with
the direct
election
requirement of
Section
7 of the
Constitution.
Voters
exercising
that right below-the-line
found the lack
of optional
preferential
voting there
gave them a
much harder
task than above-the-line
voters, with
more risk of
inadvertently
voting
informally. Senator
Nick Xenophon
of South
Australia
introduced a 2013 bill similar to Bob Brown's, but it
differed by
proposing
optional
preferential
voting below-the-line.
A 2015
article in The
Canberra Times
by Senator
Xenophon
let him
explain his
bill, and
Malcolm
Mackerras's
two telling
analyses of
his bill's
unacceptability
can be
accessed by a
hyperlink in
that article,
and an
article on 18
January 2016.
A letter
by PRSA
President,
Bogey Musidlak,
on 14 January
2016, gives
the PRSA view. In
election
campaigns
under the
Greens' and
Senator
Xenophon's
proposals,
party
operatives
would still
ply voters
with how-to-vote
cards
urging them to
vote above-the-line.
That
pressure on
voters to
refrain from
marking their
own below-the-line
ballot would
still be
heavily
re-inforced in
the Greens'
bill by the
existing and
daunting
unnecessary
requirement
for voters below-the-line
to mark a
preference for
virtually
every
individual
candidate,
regardless of
how many there
are (110
candidates
appeared on
the NSW Senate
ballot-paper
in 2013). Senator Brown's Bill would unfortunately not have abolished the political parties' self-serving party-oriented above-the-line contrivance in respect of any particular party's block of candidates, and would have also failed to remove the then daunting and unjustifiable requirement for below-the-line voters at Senate elections to mark virtually every square in order to be able to cast a valid vote. The Bill was thus not even-handed, nor did it make the workloads of both categories of voter more equal. By contrast, for Victoria's upper house ballot-papers, the minimum number of preferences to be marked for a formal below-the-line ballot is equal to the number of positions to be filled in the electoral district involved, and in NSW only 15 preferences need to be marked, although there are 21 vacancies to fill. A major
recommendation of the Joint
Standing Committee on Electoral
Matters in its Final
Report on the 2013 Federal
Election was to amend the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918 to
discontinue the provision
for Group Voting Tickets,
and to replace the present
formality requirement for below-the-line
votes to show full marking of
virtually all preferences with a
requirement that only a number of
preferences equal to the number of
positions be filled need be
marked. It was proposed
unfortunately to maintain an above-the-line
option, but to replace its
existing form by a so-called
optional preferential vote for a
block of candidates, to be grouped
by party in the party's preferred
order, much as in Senator
Bob Brown's bill above. The Turnbull Liberal Government made commendable improvements to the Act in March 2016 to adopt that above-the-line option, and also partial optional preferential voting below-the-line, for a minimum of 12 preferences to be marked for a ballot to be formal, which was the first time such a mild formality requirement had existed for Senate elections since 1934, despite attempts to achieve that by the Menzies Opposition in 1948, and the Whitlam Government in 1974 and 1975. |